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ABSTRACT 
Ever since the Nationalist Party retreated from the Chinese mainland to the island 
of Taiwan after its defeat in the Chinese civil war by the Chinese Communists in 1949, 
China has been a divided country. The division has provoked tensions and occasionally 
hostilities across the Taiwan Strait. Debate and speculation have long surrounded the 
possible political unification of Taiwan with the mainland. Unification would have far-
reaching implications for security, economic relations, and political ties in Asia as a 
whole. It would force Japan and the United States to re-examine their positions in the 
region.  
The major question to be addressed by this thesis is: what would be the strategic 
implications for Japan and by extension the United States if China and Taiwan were to 
reunify peacefully? The ramifications for both countries will be different based on a 
number of factors, including historical, military, and socio-political considerations. The 
relationship between Japan and the United States would be altered based on the peaceful 
reunification of China and Taiwan. This thesis concludes that Japan would find itself in a 
less secure security context while the United States would be able to focus its military 
attention elsewhere. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................4 
D. ROAD MAP......................................................................................................4 
II. HISTORICAL RELATIONS .....................................................................................7 
A. CHINA AND TAIWAN...................................................................................7 
B. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ..........................................................8 
C. CHINA AND JAPAN ....................................................................................10 
D. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES ........................................................14 
III. CHINA AND TAIWAN UNIFIED...........................................................................17 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................17 
B. CHINA’S GAINED MILITARY COMPONENT ......................................17 
C. ECONOMIC...................................................................................................24 
D. POLITICAL ...................................................................................................30 
1. Paths to Unification............................................................................31 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................33 
IV. JAPAN ........................................................................................................................35 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................35 
B. MILITARY ISSUES......................................................................................35 
C. ECONOMIC RELATIONS ..........................................................................38 
D. SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP ..................42 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................45 
V. JAPAN’S OPTIONS..................................................................................................47 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................47 
B. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MECHANISMS..................................48 
1. Balancing ............................................................................................48 
2. Bandwagoning....................................................................................50 
3. Deterrence...........................................................................................52 
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................54 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................57 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................65 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Comparison of China-Taiwan military to next largest. ...................................23 
Figure 2. Projected Growth of Chinese Economy...........................................................24 
Figure 3. Growing Interdependence of the Chinese and Taiwanese Economies ............29 
Figure 4. Japan and China’s Energy Consumption by Sector.........................................42 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Miller for providing guidance in the 
completion of this work. Before attending Naval Postgraduate School, I did not have the 
interest in Asia I do today and I would like to thank Dr. Miller for helping to foster that. 
 I would like to thank my wife Victoria for her love and support during his time. 
Without your patience and understanding in this endeavor and throughout my naval 
career none of this would be possible. Thank you for taking such great care of Grace and 
Toni in order to allow me to concentrate on my studies. I love you more every day. 
 I would also like to thank my mother, father, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister 
and brother. You have all played a valuable role in helping me to complete my course of 
study through your love and encouragement. I would specifically like to thank my father 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
Ever since the Nationalist Party retreated from the Chinese mainland to the island 
of Taiwan after its defeat in the Chinese civil war by the Chinese Communists in 1949, 
China has been a divided country. The division has provoked tensions and occasionally 
hostilities across the Taiwan Strait. Debate and speculation have long surrounded the 
possible political unification of Taiwan with the mainland. Unification would have far-
reaching implications for security, economic relations, and political ties in Asia as a 
whole. It would force Japan and the United States to re-examine their positions in the 
region. This thesis examines the strategic consequences of Taiwan-mainland reunification 
as it would affect Japan and by extension the United States. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
Over the past thirty years, both China and Taiwan have grown into economic 
powers in their own right. Both China and Taiwan are among Japan’s and the United 
States’ top ten trading partners.1 The question arises how these relationships would be 
affected by a unification of China and Taiwan. Future trends in Taiwan’s politics are 
unclear.2 There are political factions that wish to reunify with mainland China, others 
who wish Taiwan to become an independent state, and still others who wish for the status 
quo to remain.3 The relationships that Taiwan currently maintains with the United States 
and Japan are important to each side of the relationship. These associations would no 
doubt be affected by a peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.  
                                                 
1 Daniel Workman, “Japan’s Trade Buddies,” 05 January 2007, 
http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/article.cfm/japan_s_trade_buddies. (accessed 06 February 2007); 
Daniel Workman, “America’s Trade Buddies,” 21 November 2007, 
http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/article.cfm/america_s_trade_buddies. (accessed 06 February 2007). 
2 Taiwan Politics: Political Outlook for 2007-08, EIU ViewsWire, 27 November 2006. 
3 John J. Tkacik, Jr., “America’s Stake in Taiwan,” (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation 
2007), 1-2. 
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Recent events show that the possibility of a peaceful reunification of Taiwan with 
mainland China is not entirely outside the realm of possibility. Lien Chen and James 
Soong, leaders of the KMT and the People First Party and two of Taiwan’s top 
conservative political leaders, traveled to China in 2005 and were met with great 
enthusiasm.4 As recently as the elections of 2000 and 2004, candidates running on a 
platform of reunification were nearly elected president of Taiwan.5 This fact illustrates 
the dichotomy that exists in the politics of Taiwan today.  
An extensive body of literature has addressed resolution of the China-Taiwan 
unification issue. It may become be possible for China to decide to retake Taiwan by 
force and conquer the island militarily. Another possibility would be the converse of that 
scenario, where by Taiwan would conquer mainland China by force during a time of 
great unrest on the mainland. There are also several situations where a negotiated 
settlement could be reached.6 This may be in the form of “one China, two systems,” 
Taiwan could become a province of China, or perhaps once democracy has found its way 
to China, Taiwan would rejoin the mainland.7 This thesis focuses on the peaceful paths of 
possible reunification. Among these several different possibilities, two main positions 
have dominated the debate. At this point all possibilities are purely speculative because 
no one really knows for sure whether or how the issue of reunification will ultimately be 
resolved. The manner in which reunification were to occur would have great impact on 
the future course of international relation regarding the three countries. Every offshoot in 
the future would be path dependent on the resolution of the conflict.8 The purpose of this 
thesis is not to determine which viewpoint has the most merit, but rather to examine the 
ramifications for Japan and the United States should a reunification occur.  
                                                 
4 Thomas Clouse, “Taiwan and China Play at brinksmanship,” Global Finance, New York: June 2005, 
Vol. 19, Iss. 6, 8, 1  
5 Tkacik, “America’s Stake in Taiwan,” 6.  
6 Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel L. Byman, Roger Cliff, David T. Orletsky, David 
Shlapak, and Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications. 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999), 66. 
7 Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 2005), 36. 
8 Richard Stubbs, Rethinking Asia’s Economic Miracle, (Houndsmill, England: Plagrave McMillan, 
2005), 31-32. 
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Under the “one China, two systems” policy, Taipei would accept that Taiwan is 
indeed part of China and that the People’s Republic is the legitimate government of 
China, but Beijing would still allow it retain certain aspects of autonomy. While opinion 
surveys among Taiwan’s people have concluded this to be popular,9 the interpretations of 
the degree of autonomy on the mainland differ from those on Taiwan. Some in academia 
in Taiwan do not believe the “one China, two systems” policy is a viable option for 
reunification. Many of the indigenous population believe that there is no room for this 
type of prescription in Chinese politics today. This is in no small part due to the 
demographic makeup of the island. As of 2000, 84 percent of the island was Taiwanese 
in terms of birth, with the remaining 16 percent being of mainland or aboriginal 
descent.10   
Another group believes that reunification will never take place and that 
independence is the future of Taiwan. Taiwan’s current president, Chen Shui-bian, said in 
his 2007 New Year’s address: 
Our country, Taiwan, has a total land area of 36,000 square kilometers. 
The sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to its 23 million people, not to the 
People's Republic of China. Only the people of Taiwan have the right to 
decide Taiwan's future. Meanwhile, Taiwan is a part of the world, not a 
part of China.11  
This statement, combined with the results of recent polling data, shows a desire 
for mainland China to recognize that Taiwan is already an independent nation and to 
begin to deal with it as such.12 
                                                 
9 Philip Beckman, “One China?,” The Washington Post, December 25, 2001, A.32, 07 February 2007. 
10 Robert Scalapino, “Taiwan—Opportunities and Challenges,” in Alexander C. Tan, Steve Chan, and 
Calvin Jillson, ed. Taiwan’s National Security: Dilemmas and Opportunities,( Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2001), 3. 
11 Chen Shui-bian, “President Chen’s New Year Message,” 01 January 2007, The Office of the 
President of the Republic of China.  
12 Chen Shui-bian, “President Chen’s New Year Message,” 01 January 2007, In his speech to the 
nation on January 1, 2007, President Chen quoted Mainland Affairs Council opinion poll numbers of 75.8 
percent of respondents supported the government's ongoing efforts to promote Taiwan's participation in the 
United Nations, and over 70 percent approved of applying for UN membership under the name Taiwan.  
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While there is much emotion on all sides of the reunification issue, the 
China/Taiwan reunification debate can also be placed in theoretical context. Several 
theories specifically come to mind with regard to unification and the ramifications for 
Japan: balance of power theory, bandwagoning theory, deterrence, and sanctions versus 
positive incentives. These theories may prove helpful in providing a conceptual model of 
analysis. 
The major question to be addressed by this thesis is: what would be the strategic 
implications for Japan and by extension the United States if China and Taiwan were to 
reunify peacefully? This thesis will also study the political and economic factors that 
would affect the military aspects as well.  
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis analyzes the current political, economic and military situation in East 
Asia specifically as it relates to China, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. This 
investigation is used to determine possible regional military, political, and economic 
concerns in the event of a peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan. Specific attention 
is paid to the strategic concerns for Japan and the United States with the loss of such a 
key regional asset, as well as the possibility of an Asian arms race. This thesis concludes 
with, recommendations for Japanese courses of action. 
There are numerous secondary sources that treat this subject. The governments in 
each of the countries have put forward official documents pertinent to this thesis. An 
extensive amount of primary sources exist as well, and these sources are used whenever 
applicable. Interview transcripts from policy makers are also utilized when appropriate. 
D. ROAD MAP 
Chapter II addresses the historical relations between Japan, China, and the United 
States. The ramifications of a unification of China and Taiwan as related to Japan and by 
extension the United States are largely based upon the historical record between the three 
nations. This thesis only deals with the more recent relations between the two 
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civilizations dating back to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. From this starting point 
the issues affecting the evolution of the relationship are illustrated. It is also important to 
address the relationship between the United States and China and the United States and 
Japan. Security in Asia rests firmly upon the back of America. Japan has enjoyed 
unprecedented freedom from worry with regards to its own security situation thanks to 
the relationship it has with the United States. Were a change to occur in the status of 
China and Taiwan, depending upon how and why the alteration arose, the security of 
Japan could be significantly altered. 
Chapter III examines the effects of a combined China and Taiwan militarily, 
economically, and politically. This chapter addresses the military technology China 
would benefit from as a result of unifying with Taiwan. The United States has been 
supplying Taiwan with the sophisticated military technology and hardware, and China 
would benefit from this greatly. China and Taiwan would also be a most formidable for 
economically. China is on its way to becoming the largest economy in the world and the 
addition of Taiwan would mean this would happen sooner. This chapter also considers 
the political affiliation of the newly unified China and Taiwan. How they are governed 
will have an impact on relations with other nations in the region.  
Chapter IV looks at the Japanese side of the equation. First, the military situation 
is discussed. The implications for a combined China and Taiwan have definite 
ramifications for the future of the Japanese mainland. There is a contingent in the Japan 
that believes this could stimulate revision of Article Nine of the constitution the 
transformation and the Self Defense Force into a full-fledged national military. Past 
foreign policy decisions are looked at in order to help project how a future unification of 
China and Taiwan may affect Japan’s policy choices regarding China. The economic 
interdependence of China, Japan and Taiwan are examined as well. This is an interesting 
facet of the relationship as it has continued to grow despite other differences. The 
implications upon the U.S.-Japan relationship are also discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter V concludes with specific recommendations and observations about the 
implications of a unified China and Taiwan for Japan and by extension the United States. 
 6
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II. HISTORICAL RELATIONS 
A. CHINA AND TAIWAN 
This thesis addresses some of historical sovereignty perceptions of China, 
Taiwan, and Japan in order to build a framework for the analysis. While Taiwan first 
became part of the Qing Empire in 1684, it was not until 1887 that it was recognized as a 
province.13 Provincial status lasted for less than a decade when Japan and the Qing 
Empire went to war with each other in the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War over Korea. As 
part of the settlement of this war, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895. As a result, Taiwan 
was a Japanese colony until the end of World War II in 1945. The Japanese were 
responsible for helping to modernize the island of Taiwan. Following WWII, the 
Republic of China (ROC) under Chiang Kai-shek asserted sovereignty over Taiwan, but 
as a result of the Chinese civil war fought between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and the ruling ROC led by the Nationalist Party (KMT) the island became the home of 
the displaced Nationalist government. From the first, the victorious CCP claimed that 
Taiwan was a part of China, now governed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC, but 
the ROC rejected the surrender demands of the CCP and claimed itself to continue as the 
sole legitimate government of all of China. It was not until 1945, when the KMT set up 
operations on the island, that it was first administered by a Chinese nation-state. These 
conflicting dates are the origin of much of the debate today regarding the sovereignty of 
Taiwan. 
China was traditionally the hegemonic culture of East Asia. As a result of the 
1839-41 Opium War, The Qing Empire was forced by Great Britain to use Western 
conventions of international relations in dealing with the West and found itself in a less 
than hegemonic role ever since. This began what contemporary Chinese recall as a 
“century of humiliation,” motivating them to recover its once prominent position in Asia 
                                                 
13 John R. Sheperd, “The Island Frontier of Ch’ing, 1684-1780,” in Murray Rubenstein, ed. Taiwan a 
New History. (Armonk, NY: East Gate Book, 1999), 109. 
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as well as the rest of the world.14 Given China’s rise in the last three decades, they are 
well on their way to erasing this time period from the their collective memory.  
B. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES  
The United States and China have shared a long, ever evolving history since their 
first interactions in the 1780s.15 In 1844, the United States capitalized on the British 
victory in the Opium War and demanded most favored nation status of its own. Since 
then, there have been several events in the history of U.S.-China relations that have 
served to shape the relationship into what it is today. At times the United States and 
China have been antagonistic, and at times there has been a sense of ambivalence towards 
each other.  
With the loss of the Nationalist party at the hands of the communists in 1949 and 
subsequent retreat of Chiang Kai- shek and his compatriots to the island Taiwan, the 
status of Taiwan has since had greater impact on the U.S.-China relationship than any 
other issue.16 Even before WWII, China had been embroiled in a civil war between the 
communists and the Kuomintang (KMT).17 The United States recognized the ROC, led 
by the KMT and its charismatic leader Chiang Kai- shek. For a variety of reasons, in the 
years following WWII, the KMT was defeated by the communists. After the KMT lost its 
foothold on the mainland in 1949, the United States was ready to give up on its 




                                                 
14 Rhoads Murphey, East Asia a New History, (New York, NY: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 286. 
15 Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 144. 
16 Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institute Press, 2005), 3. 
17 Jung Chang, The Unknown Story of Mao, (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2006). This book lays 
out the entire history of the rise of Mao to power including his thirty year long struggle with the Nationalist 
Party for control of China.  
18 Keith Maguire, The Rise of Modern Taiwan, (Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
1998), 131. 
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outbreak of the Korean War that forced American politicians to re-examine the 
importance of the island of Taiwan as a buttress against the expansion of communist 
aggression.19 
During the 1960s, the Nixon administration began to believe the possibility of 
direct conflict with the PRC over Indochina was a reality.20 President Nixon authorized 
Henry Kissinger to begin a secret channel of communication with the communists on the 
mainland at that time. The culmination of this dialogue was Dr. Kissinger’s trip to the 
PRC in 1971. It was not until 1972, however that the United States began to reestablish 
formal ties with the CCP on the mainland.21 The international view of communism had 
begun to change. It was no longer viewed as a monolithic belief, but was seen as having a 
U.S.S.R. camp and a CCP camp.22 In 1979 the United States officially recognized the 
PRC as the government of China and ceased formal relations with the government on 
Taiwan. At this time the United States also began a formal trade relationship with the 
PRC.23 Following this the PRC began its economic reforms and transition to a market 
economy, a process that has advanced through the 1990s.24  This was in no small part due 
to the PRC’s relationship with the United States.  
Trade between the two countries has risen every year since. Currently China is the 
U.S.’s fourth largest export partner and the United States is at the very top of China’s 
trade partner list.25 The economic interdependence of the two countries grows every year. 
China currently holds $1.3 trillion in U.S. foreign reserves.26 There was speculation that 
                                                 
19 Maguire, 133. 
20 Murry Rubenstein, Taiwan a New History, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sahrpe Inc., 1999), 437. 
21 Joint Communiqué of The United States of America and The People’s Republic of China, February 
28, 1972. 
22 Maguire, 135. 
23 Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between The United States of 
American and The People’s Republic of China, 15 December 1978. 
24 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2007), 85. 
25 Workman, (accessed 06 September 2007). 
26 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “China Threatens ‘Nuclear Option’ of Dollar Sales,” London Telegraph, 
8 September 2007. 
 10
this large holding could be used as a weapon against the United States in order to destroy 
the economy, but this move would obviously have repercussions in China as well. Even 
following the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, the United States did not cut off trade 
relations totally, but did impose sanctions on some economic interactions. This was more 
due to investor uncertainty in the stability of the Chinese market than anything else.27 
While economically the relationship has remained strong, there have been 
political and military issues that have arisen. In 1995 United States granted a visa to the 
president of Taiwan in order to speak at Cornell University.28 The PRC leadership 
viewed this as the United States Government endorsing Taiwan’s quest for 
independence.29 As a response to this the PRC decided it should show the Taiwanese 
people the United States lacked the will power to stand up for the people of Taiwan. The 
PRC lobbed missiles close to the island of Taiwan. It did not count on the resolve of the 
Clinton administration to maintain peace in the region.30 The U.S. government sent two 
aircraft carrier battle groups to the Strait as an answer. This sent the message that the 
United States was committed to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue. Not 
necessarily that the United States was in support of either side. More recently there has 
been the issue of a Navy P-3 aircraft colliding with a Chinese fighter aircraft in 2001 and 
a Chinese submarine surfacing in the midst of a U.S. carrier battle group in 2006. These 
incidents have led to increased mistrust and reservations about the rapid and multifaceted 
modernization of the Chinese military. 
C. CHINA AND JAPAN 
China’s rise and the reemergence of Japan as a regional leader have put these two 
nations on a collision course for dominance as Asia’s next great power.31 This does not 
                                                 
27 Naughton, 403. 
28 Rubenstein, 448. 
29 Nancy Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-China-Taiwan Crisis, (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), 195. 
30 Ibid., 196. 
31 James Kelly, Sino-Japanese Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, 2007), 1. 
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necessarily mean it will come to war, but competition is fierce. As both countries become 
more involved globally, there will be more instances for rivalry as well as cooperation. 
While the relationship has become more amenable in the past few decades, there is still 
much distrust on both sides. Much of this stems from the fact that both nations have long 
collective memories.  
Since the 1894 Japan and China have been involved in two major wars. The first 
was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 at the end of which Japan gained control of 
Taiwan. The second was from 1937-1945, the end of WWII, at which time Japan was 
forced to give back control of Taiwan to China. One point of contention is to whom 
control of Taiwan reverted. Some believe it reverted to Nationalist control, while others 
say it remained undecided.32  
Japan, being an island nation, knew that its need for natural resources could not be 
met by indigenous sources alone. Japan also viewed the Nationalist government on the 
mainland of China as weakened by its continued war with the communists.33 The 
Japanese were attempting to become an imperial power in the design of the Western 
nations.  For these reasons, Japan developed the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
Japan was a brutal adversary. One particular incident, known as “The rape of Nanking,” 
involved the murder by Japanese troops of some 100,000 Chinese civilians.34 According 
to some estimates, over 3 million Chinese military members and over 9 million civilians 
were killed during the eight years of the Second Sino-Japanese War.35 While this 
brutality is still on the minds of many Chinese, it also weighs heavily in the actions taken 
by Japan when dealing with its Asian neighbors.36 The historical legacy of Japanese 
atrocities will not soon be forgotten.  
                                                 
32 Bush, 18-19. 
33 James McClain, Japan: A Modern History, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002), 
471. 
34 Hsu, 584. 
35 “Sino-Japanese War-Major Invasion of Eastern China by Japan,” http://www.japan-
101.com/history/sino1.htm, (accessed 07 September 2007). 
36 Bhubhindar Singh, “ASEAN’s Perceptions of Japan: Change and Continuity,” Asian Survey Vol. 
42:2, 2002, 18; Hsu, 753. 
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During the Cold War, Japan followed America’s lead regarding relations with the 
PRC. This was largely due to the fact that in the early years following WWII, the United 
States persuaded the Japanese government to limit its interactions with the communist 
government of China.37 In 1972, only after the United States signed the Shanghai 
communiqué with the PRC, did Japan sign one of its own.38 It was at that time that Japan 
recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China. However, it was not until six 
years later that Japan and China finally signed their Peace and Friendship Treaty.39 This 
was due to the fact that both Japan and China could not agree on the terms regarding an 
attempt by either side to become the hegemonic power of Asia as well as to oppose any 
power that attempted to become such.40 In addition to the anti-hegemony clause, there 
was a provision that stated the treaty was to play no role in either country’s dealings with 
a third state. 
The Japanese government was initially surprised by the United States lack of 
consultation on the opening of relations with the PRC.41 Only three minutes prior to 
President Nixon’s announcement of the new relationship with the PRC was the Japanese 
prime minister informed.42 While the Japanese government was pleased to be able to 
develop a new relationship with China, it was also more wary of its own relationship of 
the United States than before. In an attempt to strengthen the new relationship, Chinese 




                                                 
37 Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, (Cambridge, MA: 
The Century Foundation, 2007), 317. 
38 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of The People’s Republic of 
China, 29 September 1972. 
39 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 12 August 1978. 
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reparations.43 Later the PRC would come to lament this resolution. Later amid protests 
from the PRC government, Japan acquiesced and offered economic aid as a form of 
reparations.44  
A point of constant contention between Japan and much of the rest of Asia, 
including China, has been the Yasukuni shrine. The shrine was commissioned by the 
Meji Emperor in 1869. Since that time it has become to be revered as the site at which to 
pay homage to the over 2 million souls of Japan’s war dead. The controversy is that there 
are fourteen Class A war criminals, including the infamous Prime Minister Tojo Hideki 
in that number. Only two Japanese prime ministers have visited the shrine, Yasuhiro 
Nakusone in 1985 and Junichiro Koizumi as recently as 2006.45  There has been no 
louder criticism of the visits than that of the PRC.  
China is wary of the reemergence of the Japanese military and Japan is concerned 
about China’s massive military modernization efforts.46 The inclusion of Taiwan, its 
weaponry, and the technology it has accumulated from its relationship with the United 
States over the years, would do nothing to assuage the tensions of this regional rivalry. 
Nationalist sentiment in both countries continues to grow and anti-Japanese and anti-
Chinese sentiment is at the heart of it for the respective countries.47 There have been 
accusations by the governments of these two countries that the other has not done much 
to discourage this animosity; conversely their policies have continued to fuel it.48 China 
is one of the major barriers to Japan joining the United Nations Security council.49 
Neither is China keen for Japan to play a larger role militarily in Asia. 
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Japan and China have also had territorial disputes over the years. The Senkaku 
Islands are a small group of islands which lie in the East China Sea between Japan, 
China, and Taiwan. All three claim sovereignty over these islands. It is not so much that 
the islands that are important, but that the oil and natural gas in the East China Sea that 
are of consequence.50 Whoever controls the islands would be able to push its claim to the 
sea bed reserves out further in to the sea, which would in turn allow for a larger portion 
of the rewards found underneath. Japan is becoming more and more concerned about 
securing sources of oil and natural gas.51 This concern for resource protectionism means 
that this dispute is not likely to be resolved anytime soon. 
D. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES  
The relationship between Japan and the United States started at the barrel of a 
gun, both with Commodore Perry in 1853 and again in modern times with General 
Macarthur.52 Following WWII, the United States and Japan formed a significant 
relationship that has endured to this day. The United States was the chief architect of 
Japan’s political order following its defeat at the hands of the allies in WWII. The 
defense arrangement that the two countries came to in 1951 has proved to be mutually 
beneficial for both countries on many fronts. With the United States ensuring the security 
of Japan this meant the Japanese were able to focus on their economy.53 The arrangement 
provides for the United States a position in the Far East in which to maintain facilities 
and areas. But, with the end of the Cold War, the value of the continued U.S-Japan 
security alliance came under close scrutiny.  
During the 1970s Japan and the United States began to develop an economic 
rivalry.54 By the 1960s, the Japanese economy grew at spectacular rates in part to the 
                                                 
50 Kelly, 3. 
51 Taro Aso, “Japan’s Foreign Policy and Global Energy Security,” OECD Observer, May 2007, 37. 
52 McClain, 115, 518. 
53 Ted Osius, The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It, 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), Chapter 1. 
54 Leon Hollerman, “Japan’s Economic Impact on the United States,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 460, March 1982, 127. 
 15
security blanket provided by the United States. As a result of this, the nature of the U.S.-
Japan relationship was changing. No longer did the economic success of Japan depend 
entirely on the U.S. economy.55 The trade link between the two countries led to a U.S. 
deficit in favor of Japan. As a result U.S. workers and consumers began to call for limits 
on Japanese goods and investment in U.S. markets.56 In response to the American job 
losses and subsequent public and political friction over the perceived take over by the 
Japanese, Japan placed self-imposed limits on it imports.57  
With the decline of Soviet power and rise of Japanese economic power, security 
concerns became less important and economic priority gained significance.58 The self- 
imposed restriction on Japanese exports to the United States did little to quell the fears of 
the American public. Both the American public and politicians began to question the 
value of the United States continuing its security relationship with Japan as it had since 
the end of WWII. The perception was that Japan was free riding at the expense of 
American tax payers for a threat that no longer existed. This belief lasted until the mid 
1990, when China launched its missiles at Taiwan and a renewed sense of purpose was 
given to the U.S.-Japan alliance.59  
Just as things in the U.S. - Japan relationship appeared to have found a new sense 
of purpose, the September 1995 rape by several U.S. service members of a young 
Japanese girl in Okinawa occurred.60 The Japanese public began to see the U.S. presence 
in Japan, and Okinawa especially, as a threat to the Japanese public’s safety. The 
response the Japanese public wanted was two fold. First it wanted to see the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Japan revised. Second, it 
wanted the bases moved out of the more populated areas.61 The United States agreed to 
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work on moving the bases, but was unwilling to review the SOFA due to the fact that it 
would mean reviewing all such agreements the United States maintained with its other 
partners world wide.  
While the U.S. - Japan relationship has gained strength in recent years, there has 
also been at times a sense of being second to the U.S.-China relationship. In the dispute 
over the Senkaku Islands, the United States has always remained neutral. The Japanese 
viewed this as the United States not wanting to upset the U.S. – China relationship at the 
cost of the relationship Japan and the United States shared.62 This was but one test the 
Chinese would pose between the relationship of the United States and Japan.  
                                                 
62 Funabashi, 438. 
 17
III. CHINA AND TAIWAN UNIFIED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Important in assessing the international impact as well as the internal relationship 
of the newly unified China and Taiwan will be how unification occurred. For the 
purposes of this thesis unification is posited as peaceful. But peaceful unification may 
come about via are several different avenues. Were china and Taiwan to unify peacefully, 
the newly combined nation stands to gain advanced weaponry from the relationship 
shared by the United States and Taiwan. This would present a definite advantage over 
regional adversaries. China and Taiwan are economically interdependent already to a 
certain degree. The combination of these two economies even further would make it one 
of the most economically powerful nations in the world. 
B. CHINA’S GAINED MILITARY COMPONENT 
When the Nationalist government was forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the 
United States was not keen to intervene in the civil war between the Nationalists and the 
communists.63 Only after the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 did the United States 
begin to back the KMT on Taiwan.64 Since that time, Taiwan has benefited from military 
assistance from the United States. This backing has come in the form of both arms and 
financial aid. With the help of its American benefactor, Taiwan was able to maintain its 
independence from China for over fifty years. This was due in no small part to the 
advanced weaponry provided by its ally across the Pacific. With the peaceful unification 
of China and Taiwan, mainland China would be the new beneficiary of this technology. 
In recent years Taiwan’s defense budget has dwindled because of political 
controversy.65 Even so, the quality and quantity of arms possessed by Taiwan which are 
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of U.S. origin remains quite substantial. The two branches of service that have benefited 
the most from this partnership are the Navy and the Air Force.66 While the army would 
not be in the shape it is today without U.S. assistance, the Navy and Air Force are the 
driving power of the Taiwanese military. This more advanced technology would prove 
quite useful to the Chinese were a peaceful unification between Taiwan and the Mainland 
to occur. 
In 2001, the United States government approved the sale of four decommissioned 
Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan.67 While the United States is still thinking through its 
decision to provide Taiwan with Aegis technology, it has approved and delivered four 
refurbished Kidd-class destroyers. While these destroyers were no longer being used by 
the U.S. military, they were refitted with more advanced technology than they previously 
possessed. These newly acquired assets gave the Taiwanese navy an air defense 
capability against their enemies they did not previously have.68  
The rest of the Taiwanese fleet is no lightweight either. While the surface force is 
made up of some older and some newer vessels, compared to most other Asian navies, it 
is a formidable opponent.69 With the above mentioned Kidd-class destroyer, the 
Taiwanese navy is modernizing for the future. The Taiwanese currently rank sixth on the 
list of military technology and hardware importers, just behind the People’s Republic of 
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China, which is fifth.70 The Navy is currently in production of a class of advanced patrol 
boats which will employ the most advanced Anti Surface Cruise Missiles Taiwan has.71 
Taiwan has a meager submarine force of its own. The submarines it does possess 
are Dutch-built Zvardiss-class diesel powered attack boats.72 While Taiwan may only 
own two attack submarines in its fleet, it does have the deep water ports to facilitate 
submarine basing. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would be able to project 
further off the coast and out into the Pacific. This could be a way to disrupt the Sea Lines 
of Communication (SLOCs) much relied upon by the Japanese economy for the 
importation of vital resources. The impediment of sea shipments to a country whose 
economy relies upon over 5 trillion dollars annually in imports could be crippling.73 
Taiwan also has an arsenal of quite capable indigenous anti-ship cruise missiles. 
Currently working on the development of an upgraded ASCM, the Hsiung-feng III, 
designed specifically to destroy the PLAN Sovreminy class destroyers.74 This technology 
could easily be used against the Japanese Atago-class destroyers as well. These missiles 
are believed to be better quality than the Russian made SS-N-22 ASCM. The Hsiung-
feng III has the ability to be launched from airborne platforms, waterborne platforms, and 
ground stations. This is just one of the several different varieties possessed by Taiwan. 
The PLAN would gladly welcome these assets, as well as the rest of the Taiwanese naval 
assets.  
The PLAN is currently broken up into three districts: the North Sea Fleet, the 
South Sea Fleet, and the East Sea Fleet. The East Sea Fleet is concentrated on Taiwan, 
while the North Sea Fleet is dedicated to monitoring Japan and the Korean peninsula.75 
Were the Taiwan issue to be resolved peacefully, the East Sea Fleet would then be able to 
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join its North Sea counterpart and focus its attention on Japan and the Korean Peninsula 
as well. Since the largest of the fleets is the South China Sea Fleet, it is likely that the 
East Sea Fleet would not be divided among the two other fleets post unification.  
Perhaps one of the most important PLAN assets that concern Japan are the 
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) which are able to hit targets on the 
mainland of Japan.76 These missiles have been a large part of China’s recent efforts to 
modernize its military. These missiles are believed to not only be able to attack targets on 
land, but also Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels while on the open 
ocean. While some JMSDF assets are equipped with the capabilities to combat such 
threats, the vast majority are not.77 The PLAN is working diligently to improve several 
missile capabilities in order to increase the probability of success in combat.  
 While Taiwan may not have one of the largest Air Forces in the world, it is 
qualitatively superior to some that are quantitatively larger.78 The Taiwanese fly some of 
the most advanced aircraft in the world. Their force is comprised of F-16’s, Mirage 2000-
5’s, and the indigenously produced F-CK-1 Ching-Kuo.79 These are all current 
generation fighter aircraft capable of multiple mission roles. Not only do the Taiwanese 
possess the hardware, but their pilots have received top notch training at facilities in the 
United States.80 The combination of the aircraft and pilots make a lethal pair. This would 
no doubt be welcomed by the Chinese military.  
While the addition of the Taiwanese army to the People Liberation Army (PLA) 
would be an asset, it would not have the same impact as the addition of the other services. 
The PLA ground force is currently 1.6 million members strong, while the Taiwanese 
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army only has 200,000 members.81 The Taiwanese army suffers from low morale, poorly 
maintained equipment, and unmotivated senior enlisted personnel.82 Considering these 
facts, it may be more effective for the PLA to disband the Taiwanese army all together 
and garrison PLA troops in Taiwan. Since Taiwan would be a part of China, this scenario 
should not present a problem depending on the path chose to unify the two.  
The military of the PRC is already a formidable force. On paper, this is the largest 
military in the world. The modernization of the PLAN surface fleet is focused on 
defeating a U. S. carrier strike group deployed to the Strait to interdict on behalf of 
Taiwan. With this contingency out of the way, the PLAN could begin to make 
preparations for a larger role in the areas peripheral to its vast coastline. The 
Sovremenniy II class guided missile destroyer’s (DDG) main purpose is to carry weapons 
capable of sinking an aircraft carrier. This class of ship can carry eight Moskit or 
Yakhont missiles, also known as the SSN-22 Sunburn, which due to their speed and flight 
profile are difficult to defeat.83  
The PLAN is also developing its own surface vessels. The newest class is the 
Luzhou class DDG. This platform’s main function is as an AAW platform. Since the 
Sovremenniy was designed to act as one component of a larger battle fleet, the addition 
of the Luzhou and the other indigenous ships with AAW capabilities is a critical piece in 
a scenario involving a battle with the JMSDF or the permutation that exists following 
China and Taiwan’s unification. 
China is also developing a modern submarine force. It appears that rather than 
focusing time and effort on developing an aircraft carrier capability, China has decided to 
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attempt to exploit a weakness in the U.S. naval ASW capability. While the force is 
numerically large, much of the older force has antiquated weapons and propulsion 
systems. 84 It may seem that the fact that one possesses more of an inferior weapon does 
not confer an advantage. However, it has been argued that the older submarines could be 
used as decoy vessels to lure unsuspecting enemy submarines out of hiding in order for 
the more modern PLAN submarines to attack. 
The Air Force arm of the PLA, the PLAAF, is also taking on modernization 
efforts. The PLAAF leadership realizes that in today’s battle space, in order to control 
any other portion, the first area you must control is the air. To this end, it is incorporating 
more and more Russian SU-27 and SU-30 aircraft in the arsenal. These capable aircraft 
are on par with those of the West. However, Western pilots receive more actual time in 
the cockpit which translates into increased proficiency. The PLAAF is also experiencing 
the same issues as the PLA and PLAN with regards to joint operations. They are just now 
beginning to integrate all the branches of the PLAAF during maneuvers, let alone the 
other braches of service.85 
The missile force is the most modern force the PLA possesses. It has increased 
the number of ballistic missiles deployed against Taiwan substantially over the years. 
Given that the need for this arsenal to be used against Taiwan in compelling a resolution 
to that situation would no longer exist, the PLA would be able increase the number of 
weapons in a conflict elsewhere in the region, namely with Japan. Japan and the United 
States have attempted to counter this with theater missile defense (TMD), which in tests 
has proven to be a capable system. While defense against attack from North Korea is the 
explicit reason for the system, it would no doubt prove to be useful in an altercation with 
the PRC.  
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Figure 1 shows various statistics of both the Chinese and Taiwanese militaries. 
The far column offers comparison with the next largest or larger military by category. 
While independently they are both capable, combined they would become a most 
formidable opponent.  
 
China Nation Taiwan Next Largest or Larger 
 Flag   
$81,480,000,000 Yearly Military Expenditure $7,930,000,000 US is larger 
342,956,265 Available Military Manpower 5,883,828 Russia is second 
7,024,000 Total Military Personnel  1,965,000 Russia is second 
2,255,000 Active Frontline Personnel 290,000 US is second 
9,218 Aircraft 916 US is larger 
13,200 Armor 2,819 Russia, US, Israel are larger  
29,060 Artillery 2,040 Russia is second 
18,500 Missile Defense Systems  1,499 US is larger 
34,000 Infantry Support Systems  1,400 France is second 
284 Navy Units  97 US, DPRK, Russia are larger 
7 Major Ports 5 US, DPRK, AUS are second 
$81,480,000,000 Yearly Military Expenditure $7,930,000,000 US is larger 
342,956,265 Available Military Manpower 5,883,828 Russia is second 
7,024,000 Total Military Personnel  1,965,000 Russia is second 
2,255,000 Active Frontline Personnel 290,000 US is second 
9,218 Aircraft 916 US is larger 
13,200 Armor 2,819 Russia, US, Israel are larger  
29,060 Artillery 2,040 Russia is second 
18,500 Missile Defense Systems  1,499 US is larger 
34,000 Infantry Support Systems  1,400 France is second 
284 Navy Units  97 US, DPRK, Russia are larger 
7 Major Ports 5 US, DPRK, AUS are second 
Figure 1.   Comparison of China-Taiwan military to next largest.86 
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C. ECONOMIC 
While it is difficult to measure the actual size of the Chinese economy due to its 
lack of transparency, some economists have predicted that it will become one the worlds 
largest in the next several decades, even surpassing the United States.87 Japan and 
Germany are currently numbers two and three respectively in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) according to the World Bank, but China has already passed them both in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).88 The table below illustrates predictions made by Global 
Insight extrapolating current data as to when exactly the Chinese economy will surpass 
the United States. This does not take into account the addition of Taiwan into the 
equation. If it did, the date would move to the left several years.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Projected Growth of Chinese Economy89 
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Before examining what China and Taiwan would look like as combined economy, it will 
be helpful to examine their different paths to their current positions. International trade is 
of great disparity between the PRC and ROC in their early existence. The PRC was 
isolated by the U.S. embargo. In the first few decades of the PRC, it had the Soviet Union 
and its allies to depend on as trading partners. After the Sino-Soviet split in the early 
1960s, the PRC was forced to look inward for economic growth and development.90  It 
also had to depend on the Soviets for their new technology. Once the relationship was 
suddenly ended, the PRC was relegated to deal with what it had received up to that point 
and attempted to develop its own, indigenous technology. The State Planning 
Commission was responsible for the growth of the economy. Exports were considered to 
not be an important vehicle for economic growth.91 This was the time when it began to 
import technology and then have its scientist reverse engineer it. 92  
Beginning in the 1970s, the CCP began to realize the importance of exports.93 
The State began the practice of export licensing, which had been stopped in the 1950s. 
This helped to spur the economy, until the system was replaced in the 1990s by the new 
market driven price system. The system had however served its purpose.  It worked to 
protect products that were still undervalued in the home market. Also, the restriction on 
certain exports helped increase China’s earning from the sale of products it believed it 
had the market cornered on such as tin, tungsten and other minerals.94  
In contrast to the PRC, the ROC enjoyed a more robust field of options with 
regards to trading partners. Taiwan is a great example of how exports can help lead to 
industrialization and by consequently economic success.95 Perhaps due in part to the need 
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for the United States to gain allies in Asia to employ its policy of containment, the 
Truman government continued its support of the Nationalist government on Taiwan. This 
proved to be a good economic decision for both countries. The ROC did not have the 
same structure for its state owned enterprises (SOEs) that the PRC did. This meant that 
the ROC businesses were forced to be more competitive because they could not rely on 
the state to finance them in order to stay in business. 
Much like the CCP today, the KMT needed to make the economy work in order to 
remain in control. It is important to remember that at this time, the KMT was still 
attempting to legitimize its hold of power on the island of Taiwan.96 In order to make 
sure this happened, the KMT developed a unique system where by the government 
controlled industries important to political matters, and the private sector was allowed to 
develop in commerce.97 The ROC relied on its small medium enterprises (SMEs) to be 
the workhorse when it came to exports.98 This was in no small way due to the industrial 
structure of Taiwan.  SOEs along with the large private enterprises (LEs) had a grip on 
the domestic market for upstream and mid-stream industries respectively.99 This left the 
down-stream industries for the SMEs. With the SOEs and LEs focusing on the domestic 
market, meant the SMEs were free to develop the export side of the economy.100 This 
freedom was partly due to the fact that the SMEs had relatively no political power and 
therefore the ruling KMT was not concerned with them as a threat.  
According to some, the economic policies of the CCP were wasteful due to their 
being biased against the market.101  Policies such as the back yard steel furnaces have 
been cited to as a specific example. As early as 1956, the state had a stranglehold on the 
economy. It controlled most heavy industry, nearly all foreign trade, and fixed most 
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prices.102 This made it difficult to asses where more or less resources should be allocated. 
The PRC’s concentration on heavy industry failed to take into account consumption and 
neglected growth in the service sector.103 This also meant that employment in skilled 
labor and the service sector did not grow at an appreciable rate. In 1978 the agricultural 
labor force had grown 70 percent larger than it was in 1952. Coupled with the fact that 
the amount of arable land had not increased, but industrialization was emerging, equaled 
a recipe for severe underemployment, especially in the countryside.104   
Reforms for the PRC came about in the late 1970s. With the death of Mao Zedong 
in 1976, the CCP got a more progressive leader in Deng Xiaoping.105 Deng and other 
moderates had been waiting for their opportunity to direct the future of the country. The 
alterations they pioneered have continued to the present day. The reforms they enacted 
began in the countryside and were the catalyst that spread reform through all of China.106 
One of the most important things the new regime did was to allow individuals to fulfill 
their previously unmet needs, and through entrepreneurship, realize those demands that 
only the market can.107 Almost immediately improvements were seen. Annual farm 
outputs grew by more than double what they were under the old regime and the income 
of the peasants grew two times.108 While monetarily this is not that significant, it is a 
testament to what the free market economy will do for motivation. The PRC, realizing 
that China was rich in labor, decided to utilize its comparative advantage in that area and 
export labor intensive goods. It also enacted policies by which the SOEs would be forced 
to become competitive. This led to the SOEs just focusing on the business portion of the 
enterprise and selling off the rest of the company. The result was a more productive 
business while the divestiture of all non-core functions resulted in new, more productive 
private enterprises as well.  
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At roughly the same time the PRC was coming into its own economically, the 
ROC was in need of some new economic ideas. This was in part due to the fact that 
Taiwan began to exhaust their labor intensive comparative advantage.109 The ROC was 
in a position to lose much of its manufacturing industry to the emerging PRC due to the 
newly expanded PRC export market. Realizing this and understanding that Taiwan has a 
comparative advantage in capital intensive goods, the government changed gears.110 For 
many entrepreneurs in the ROC, the new market of mainland China presented a positive 
opportunity for investment due to a shared language and culture. Taiwanese investors not 
only went to the PRC, but also the rest of Asia.111 This caused the ROC to upgrade its 
exports from textiles to more technologically based industries. This would eventually 
lead the ROC to its place as the world’s third largest producer of information technology 
(IT) equipment by 1995.112  
Some scholars have argued that China and Taiwan are joined in a de facto sense 
economically already due to lack of effective state intervention in cross-strait 
economics.113 Since the early 1980s when Taiwan relaxed restrictions on trade with the 
mainland, cross-strait economic exchanges have boomed.114 As illustrated in table 1.3, 
cross-strait trade accounted for over 20 percent of total trade in 2005. The trends show 
this number to be on the rise. China is entangling Taiwan in an economic blanket that it 
may not be able to shrug off so easily.  
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Figure 3.   Growing Interdependence of the Chinese and Taiwanese Economies115 
The business communities of both China and Taiwan have been the catalyst for 
their ever increasing economic interdependence. Taiwan is more dependent on China for 
investment opportunities and export while at the same time having sent more to the 
mainland in investment capital than to any other nation.116 Trade between China and 
Taiwan hit U.S. $46.49 billion in the first half of 2007 alone.117 This was 13.3 percent 
increase from the previous year. Trade with the mainland accounted for 21.39 percent of 
Taiwan’s total trade and trade with Taiwan accounted for 12.71 percent of China’s total 
trade. These numbers indicate significant increases from the previous year.118 While 
trade between China and Taiwan has increased, trade between the two and Japan as well 
                                                 
115 Murray Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use, (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007). 
116 Bernkopf Tucker, 93. 
117 Mainland Affairs Council, “Cross-Strait Monthly Economic Statistics Brief Summary No. 175,” 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm, (accessed 09 November 2007). 
118 Ibid. 
 30
as the United States has decreased as a result.119 Were the unification of China and 
Taiwan to occur, this would be domestic rather than foreign investment, building the 
economy of one rather than two separate countries.  
The interdependence of the two economies is strikingly illustrated in the 
information technology (IT) field.120 Many businesses left Taiwan and set up shop on the 
mainland for opportunities in the Chinese domestic market, while other left for the lower 
cost of land labor and capitol.121 While the “three links” have not yet been fully 
established across the Strait, the flow of IT investment has helped make the mainland 
Taiwan’s foremost export market. In 2003 over 60 percent of all of Taiwan’s IT hardware 
was made on the mainland.122 Not only is the mainland becoming the central point for 
the production of Taiwanese IT products, but for the rest of the world as well. It is in the 
best interest of the business community to ensure that no military or political disruptions 
occur in this area.  
D. POLITICAL 
Since the Communists came to power in China, they have set as one their 
priorities the reunification of the country. This means bringing Taiwan back in the fold 
and subjugating it as the thirty-second province. It is not simply enough to say that the 
issue is resolved; it is equally as important how the decision is reached. It is therefore 
necessary to understand the nature of the unification in order to determine the political 
administration following the merger. The aftermath will be path dependent on whether 
the unification occurs violently or peacefully and with or without outside intervention.  
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The historical precedence set by current and past PRC regimes is also of consequence 
when projecting future resolution of the Taiwan Strait situation and subsequent regional 
relations. 
1. Paths to Unification 
There are several scenarios that can be played out. First it should be understood 
that a peaceful unification is not likely to occur under the current regime in either the 
ROC or the PRC. Portions of the people of Taiwan have expressed their desire not to be 
reunited with the mainland. There are many factors that this can be attributed to, one of 
which is the lack of trust in the current party. In order for peaceful unification to occur, 
the regime in power would most likely need to be democratic.  While it is an important 
point for the regime on the mainland to be democratic, this change alone is not sufficient 
to ensure the peaceful reunification of the two entities. It is entirely possible that a 
democratic regime would neither entice Taiwan to join the mainland or allow Taiwan to 
become peacefully independent from the mainland. A democratic regime would be more 
subjected to the opinion of the populous than the current government of China.  
It is also possible that a peaceful reunification could occur through a situation 
whereby both sides would be equal partners in one larger system.123 Taiwan and China 
may agree to some sort of middle ground. It is possible to envision an accord whereby 
both sides agree to not go to war and open more direct economic exchanges until the 
issue of sovereignty can be reached amicably. It is likely that with the current PRC 
regime this would not be possible. The mitigating factor would be whether or not the 
residents of Taiwan would be able to trust the guarantees provided by the PRC 
leadership. In the current political context, it is not likely this would be the case.124   
There is another option that the mainland would like to see come to fruition. The 
PRC has, since the time of Deng Xiaoping advocated the “one country, two systems” 
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policy with Taiwan as a way to unification.125 Under this type of administration, the two 
entities would both be part of the PRC, but Taiwan would retain autonomy with regards 
to certain aspects of its administration. This system has been enacted in two 
circumstances by the PRC already. In Hong Kong and Macao the “one country two 
systems” policy has met with varying success. Both of these former colonial entities are 
now special administrative regions (SAR) of the PRC.  While it is true the circumstances 
were different in both situations than for the situation in Taiwan, Macao and Hong Kong 
would still be used by the PRC as a template for the unification with Taiwan. 
Hong Kong (HK) reverted to PRC control in 1997. The “one country two 
systems” policy was implemented under the Basic Law. Under this law, which was 
drafted in 1990 prior to the retrocession of HK to the PRC by representatives from both 
HK and the mainland, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) was to be 
allowed executive, legislative, and judicial autonomy. HKSAR courts were also to 
maintain the right of final adjudication.126 The basic law of Macao Special 
Administrative Region (MSAR) is similar to that of HKSAR.127 Both Basic Laws are 
similar to constitutions. However, for all the autonomy the two SAR’s retain, the fact 
remains that they are now parts of the PRC and are subject to the sovereignty of the 
mainland.128  Recent events have shown the lack of autonomy in HKSAR with regard to 
the ultimate right of adjudication in commercial affairs. In an unprecedented move, the 
mainland government stopped the sale of one of HKSAR’s largest telecom companies to 
a foreign company.129  This move goes against one of the major tenets of the “one 
country two systems” principle. The mainland is not supposed to get involved in financial 
dealings. The pre-reversion economic prosperity of Hong Kong was one of the major 
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boons for the PRC. Hong Kong was shining star in the world market while it remained 
under British control. In 1995 Hong Kong ranked eighth in Per Capita GDP, but today it 
has dropped out of the top ten and is currently number fourteen.130  However, even with 
the intervention of the mainland into some of its dealings, the economy of Hong Kong is 
still considered to be the most open in the world.131 Hong Kong has enjoyed the top spot 
on this list for over decade. This continued ranking of HKSAR even post reversion bodes 
well for the “one country, two systems” policy. 
While this system has clearly worked for HKSAR, the situation in Taiwan is 
different. China and Britain agreed in 1984 that Hong Kong would revert to Chinese 
control after the 100 year lease on the new territories ended. Taiwan and China have no 
such deal. As far as many of those residing on Taiwan are concerned, Taiwan has been an 
independent country since the end of the Ch’ing in 1911. They see the mainland as 
having no claim to the territory of Taiwan. Those with this opinion may have to face the 
eventuality of being engulfed by their neighbor across the Strait.  
E. CONCLUSION 
A combined China and Taiwan will be a formidable state militarily and 
economically. They would have the largest military and one of the strongest economies in 
the world. China is continually trying to improve its military power. With the elimination 
of the need to use its military in a Taiwan Strait situation, the PLA would be free to 
concentrate on issues outside its own borders. The addition of the Taiwanese economy 
would prove to be a most valuable asset in leveraging China’s growing power in the 
world economy. The nature of the unification of the two sides of the Strait is of the 
utmost importance in determining the nature of the country following the reunification. 
Were it to be a peaceful reunification, the world would no doubt look to China as a world 
leader. According to many scholars the largest impediment to U.S.-China relations would 
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be eliminated, allowing for a more open relationship between two of the world’s most 
powerful countries. The prospects for Japan are not as certain as will be discussed in the 
following chapter. Conversely, were the PRC to decide to attempt a hostile takeover of 
the island of Taiwan, the world may view China as a menace and in that instance the 
question may be what form repercussions would take for China. This is not likely given 
the immense size of the Chinese market. Combined China and Taiwan could prove to be 




The situation as it exists today is quite different from what it would be in East 
Asia were China and Taiwan to reunify. As stated previously, the path to unification 
would have much impact on the situation resulting from the merger. Japan would most 
likely be disadvantaged by the unification of China and Taiwan with Beijing maintaining 
control of a unified China regardless of how the unification occurred. There would be 
various ramifications depending on the course followed but overall the security context of 
Japan would be altered for the worse even while it is still possible to see the economic 
conditions remaining constant. This chapter examines the military, economic, and socio-
political issues surrounding the relationship of Japan, China and Taiwan. 
B. MILITARY ISSUES 
Were China and Taiwan to peacefully reunify the merger of these two entities 
would shift the balance of power not only in Northeast Asia, but also the rest of the 
world. Japan would be one of the countries most affected by the reunification militarily 
due to its proximity to both Taiwan and China. The union of China and Taiwan would 
allow China to shift its military focus from retaking the island of Taiwan to other 
concerns. Undoubtedly Japan would be wary of such a reunification due to the longer 
reach that Chinese armed forces would possess. Their access to the blue water would be 
increased by several hundred miles due to the location of Taiwan.  
Both China and Japan have at times been the predominant power of Asia. China 
was seen by many in Asia as the center of the world and tribute was paid to the emperor. 
This lasted until the 1840s when the Western powers along with Japan began to make 
their way to Chinese shores and laid claim to territory that was once under the Chinese 
sphere of influence.132  Currently, they are both vying for the top position of influence. 
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China is experiencing an economic upturn. Reform policies in this large country have 
resulted in a booming economy. Taiwan ranks among the world’s strongest economies 
when it comes to purchasing power parity as well.133 The amalgamation of the Chinese 
and Taiwanese economies would produce an Asian juggernaught that would be quite 
competitive world wide. A strong economy is helpful when it comes to financing a 
world-class military.  
Following World War II, the United States drafted of a new constitution. Article 
Nine of the new constitution stipulates: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.134 
While Japan does not maintain a formal military, it has been able to establish a 
robust self-defense force instead. The force is broken down into three components, 
Japanese Self Defense Force (JSF), the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), 
and the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). The fact is that no matter what it is 
called the Japanese have built one of the best equipped, most technologically advance, 
and most modern militaries in the region if not the world.135  
There are many in Japanese politics who wish to change Article Nine of the 
Japanese constitution.136 The issue is that in order for an amendment to the Japanese 
constitution to be ratified, it must be approved by two-thirds of the Diet and then put to 
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the people for a vote.137 The reunification of China and Taiwan may be a test of the 
constitutional amendment process. Many in Japanese politics believe that Japan has 
moved past its history and should be allowed to reassume the international status it once 
had. This desire for Japan to reassume it place in the world militarily is echoed by several 
of Japan’s Southeast Asian neighbors.138  Other countries in the region already look to 
Japan as a leader in the economic arena. These states now beginning to look to Japan for 
leadership in the military arena as well. China reunifying with Taiwan, peacefully or not, 
may be the impetus that pushes the Japanese legislature and people to more closely 
examine the relevance of Article Nine in today’s world. 
Japan and the United States have had a security alliance since the end of U.S. 
occupation. Japan is cognizant of the fact that not every security threat that arises can be 
handled by its indigenous military capabilities.139 To this end it relies heavily on its U.S. 
partner for assistance. One possible outcome of the reunification of China and Taiwan 
may be an even closer relationship between the United States and Japan. Japan currently 
allows the United States to base a limited number of forces in Okinawa as well as on the 
mainland. These may be expanded to include more bases and certainly more forces 
should the reunification occur. While today there is a movement to get all U.S. troops out 
of Japan, these protesters would lose some legitimacy if China and Taiwan were to 
reunify. 
While Japan and China are not now on a pre-war footing with one another, a 
future unexpected turn of events could push the two nations into armed conflict. Japan is 
committed to its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) project with the United States.140 The 
joint U.S./Japan Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) system is designed to provide a 
missile shield around the island nation.141 Since it is a group of islands, Japan is in a good 
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position defensively against an all out ground force invasion. In order for an attacker to 
be successful, they must first gain air superiority. Since neither The PLAN nor the 
Taiwanese navy possess a working aircraft carrier, the attacking aircraft would have to be 
land based.142 The PLAAF does have fighter aircraft capable of attacking the mainland 
with enough fuel for a return home.143  This puts the onus on the JMSDF to maintain its 
proficiency. Currently the JMSDF has the ability to provide area air defense through the 
use of its AEGIS weapon system. AEGIS is a coordinated suite of advanced RADAR and 
missile technology used to defeat sophisticated aircraft, and their armaments such as the 
PLAAF SU 27/30 Fighters. This AEGIS technology helps to deny enemies the maritime 
superiority necessary to carry out an attack on the Japanese homeland as well.  
Since the end of WWII, Japan has maintained a staunch anti-proliferation stance. 
In the past Japan has been a strong supporter of the international disarmament regime.144 
The addition of another regional military and economic player to the side of their greatest 
rival may force the Japanese people to reexamine this issue carefully. Not only would 
Japan be facing a nuclear China and North Korea, but now it would also be looking at a 
nuclear capable Taiwan at its doorstep. Were Japan to decide to join the nuclear club, it 
would not be a far jump technologically. Japan already has a quite robust nuclear power 
program as well as the technical expertise to create a nuclear weapons program.145 
C. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Since the 1960s, Japan has enjoyed its place as the preeminent economic power of 
Asia. Only recently has China emerged as one of the world’s economic leaders to rival 
this position with Japan. This new relationship has the potential for shaping the 
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international landscape for the new century. While China and Japan have shared interests, 
they also share several areas of economic competition. The unification of Taiwan with 
the mainland would do nothing to ease the burden put on the intense competition that 
already exists in perception as well as reality.  
There has been debate over the years as to how involved Japan should be 
economically with China.146 Over the past thirty years trade between the two Asian 
giants has waxed and waned. In the 1990s trade began to see a sizeable increase between 
the two. However, the question remains whether or not the growing economic 
interdependence between Japan and China is enough to foster a civil relationship or if the 
inevitable trade friction and economic competition will spill over into something more 
ominous. 
In recent years, from around 1990 onward, Chinese economic development has 
accelerated exponentially.147 China has played a large role in the economic recovery of 
Japan. China is now Japan’s top trading partner.148 Japan has also in the recent past 
developed closer ties with Taiwan.149 Beijing would be wise to allow Taiwan to continue 
its economic independence along the lines of HKSAR even after unification occurred. 
Due to the strategic nature of the island and its proximity to major shipping routes, the 
reversion of Taiwan to mainland control would not be economically advantageous for 
Japan. This loss, coupled with the unprecedented growth of China, could spell trouble for 
Japan due to the greater access to open ocean trade routes the mainland would enjoy. 
Should China and Japan’s relationship devolve into something more militarily 
confrontational, China would have greater means to deny access to and from major sea 
trade routes which Japan relies on for its economy to function. 
Japan’s and China’s economies do have some areas that appear to be 
complementary. China has a large labor pool of inexpensive, skilled and unskilled 
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laborers, and needs large injections of capital into its economy. At the same time Japan 
has large amounts of money to invest and is looking for available markets.150 China can 
also count on Japan for the inflow of technological equipment as well as the means to 
educate the Chinese workers how to operate this equipment. China reciprocates by 
exporting many products to Japan and thereby lowering the cost structure.151 
Trends show the antagonism between Japan and China is heating up as well. As 
recently as 2005 Japan informed China that it would end the loans Japan had extended to 
the Chinese. The loans account for over 90 percent of the aid Japan provides to China.152 
This being said, there are other areas of competition that will play larger roles in the 
future of relations between Japan and China. This move was in response to the increasing 
economic power of China.153 
The main points of possible conflict or cooperation are resource importation and 
environmental concerns. While both China and Japan are net importers of fuel, China 
recently surpassed Japan as the second largest importer of energy.154  China is currently 
more dependent on coal than any other fuel for its energy needs. As the rise of China 
continues, this will only become more apparent. The mines and factories they are 
building are not held to the same emission standards as the rest of the world and as such, 
China reports 300,000 pollution deaths as a result of coal per year.155 Beijing maintains 
its pollution as a percentage of its population is in keeping with the rest of the world.156 
Furthermore, China insists that developing nations should be given dispensation until 
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they reach the same development level as more economically advanced countries.157 Due 
to its proximity to the Chinese mainland Japan is affected by this pollution.158 While 
Japan is exploring ways to expand its use of nuclear power, China continues to focus its 
efforts on coal. 
Since both Japan and China are net oil importers, there is inevitable competition 
between the two on this front.159 They are both looking for alternative ways to secure 
energy sources for the future. Russia and the East China Sea are most viable options for 
energy security as well as being major points of competition for China and Japan.160 Not 
only are both these regions rich in petroleum, they both have ample supplies of natural 
gas as well. As both China and Japan lessen their dependence on oil from the Middle 
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Figure 4.   Japan and China’s Energy Consumption by Sector162 
D. SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 The end of the Cold War brought about many changes in the international order of 
Asia.163 China and Japan, along with the United States previously shared a common goal 
of containing the influence of the Soviet Union but now find themselves in a different 
context. Neither China nor Japan is willing to acquiesce to the other the role of 
preeminent power of Asia.164 There are other mitigating factors in the Sino-Japanese 
socio-political and strategic relationships that make the economic interconnectedness 
between the two a less important factor in ensuring the continued peace of the region.  
 Japanese perceptions of China have been shaped by events both recent and past. 
Japan has long resisted the Sino centric sphere of influence in East Asia. There are 
however certain aspects of the relationship that seem to complement each other, such as 
the economy, to the point of flourishing. Good economic relations however have not in 
the past and likely will not in the future be enough ameliorate misperceptions and distrust 
amongst the two great powers. 
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 China continues to block Japan’s bid for a larger role in the United Nations (U.N.) 
as a permanent member of the Security Council. 165 Japan sees itself as one of the most 
influential nations in the world. Therefore it believes it is only right that it gain a seat at 
the table in the most significant body of the U.N. China is not alone in its opposition to 
Japan’s quest for Security Council membership. Several other countries have pointed out 
that it would be difficult for Japan to send troops from other countries into combat 
without being able to support such a move due to restrictions imposed by the Japanese 
constitution.  
 There have been alleged incursions by dozens of Chinese naval vessels into the 
exclusive economic zone of Japan during the early 1990s.166 The purpose of the intrusion 
was reported to be for gathering military intelligence. These incidents helped to increase 
the feelings of mutual mistrust and suspicion. Reportedly, another goal of the missions 
was to use sophisticated underwater mapping equipment to make it possible for Chinese 
submarines to transit the waters.167 As the PLAN makes preparations to push further out 
from the littorals, these maps would prove invaluable in an open ocean conflict. 
 The Japanese perceptions of China are viewed in many ways through the lens of 
nationalism. Recent polls have shown that the number of Japanese with positive feelings 
towards China is declining.168 There are many reasons this could be occurring. One of 
the catalysts is the modernization of the Chinese military. There have been reports that 
the Japanese are extremely wary of the lack of transparence regarding the PLA.169 While 
the Japanese have continued to press China for more transparency in military budgeting, 
little progress has been made. This development continues to make the Japanese 
population uneasy. With the addition of Taiwan to the mainland, as stated previously, 
China would gain some advanced technology. This would no doubt only serve to add to 
the fears of a portion of the Japanese citizenry. 
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 There is a renewed sense of nationalism growing among some younger 
Japanese.170 Nationalism is a powerful force that can trump economic relations and make 
military strength appear more important than a strong economy. Some have said that 
employing nationalism in statecraft is as difficult as riding a tiger.171 This force binds a 
group of individuals tightly around a common idea: that their country is the best in the 
world and in some cases this venom is pointed specifically at one particular nation-state. 
There is no doubt that the leadership of both Japan and China has leveraged nationalistic 
fervor. That is not to say this has occurred in a vacuum without provocation. The issue 
with nationalism is whether or not the regime in power is able to control it. Japan has so 
far been able to do this successfully to date.172 
Following the end of the Cold War, Japan saw a renewed sense of national 
assertiveness amongst its population.173 With the passing of each generation and the 
collective memory of war atrocities, the younger Japanese grow more and more impatient 
with being continually criticized about past these events.174 The continued demands by 
the Chinese leadership for more and more apologies are seen as being nothing more than 
manipulative. This perception is due in no small part to the fact that the demands usually 
are levied around the time new negotiations are entered into for Japanese aid to China.  
 There have been instances in which it has appeared that the Chinese government 
has encouraged anti-Japanese protests.175 There is a movement among some Chinese 
nationalists to never forgive Japan for its past indiscretions. They are not only unwilling 
to accept the apologies of Japanese officials, but they actively attempt to impugn Japan’s 
image internationally in their writings.176 This anti-Japanese rhetoric has done much to  
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foster the continued deterioration of the relationship between Japan and China. Anti-
Japanese protesters in some Chinese cities have turned to vandalizing local Japanese 
embassies and businesses.177 
E. CONCLUSION 
Japan would find itself in a more volatile security context due to a unification of 
China and Taiwan. It would be looking at a larger, better equipped, and better trained 
force than before the reemergence of a true “one China.” The Japanese would no doubt 
look to the United States, as they have in the past, for assistance in dealing with the new 
threat facing them. However, depending upon the circumstances surrounding the 
reunification, the United States may or may not be there in the capacity the Japanese 
would require. 
Economically Japan, China and Taiwan are interconnected on many levels. They 
have had open trade for decades. This economic interdependence has not, however led to 
improved relations in other areas. It is not likely that, given the resurgence of nationalism 
as well as other issues in both China and Japan, economic relations will be able to 
inexhaustibly ensure amelioration of the overall affiliation. The socio-political issues 
between the two countries are far too many for the economic relationship to trump them 
all. However, there is hope that the leadership of both countries will see the advantage in 
maintaining a stable security context in the region and take the necessary steps to 
maintain such. 
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V. JAPAN’S OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The response to the reunification of China and Taiwan by Japan and the United 
States could take several paths. It would depend on whether or not the unification was 
peaceful or violent and if it was violent, what was the impetus for the confrontation. This 
chapter describes the international relations mechanisms that may define the Japanese 
and U.S. response to peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan. 
All nations seek security, but what exactly security is will most likely be different 
and depend on each state’s circumstances and place in the international order.178 Without 
security, states cannot turn their attention to other endeavors. Security to a superpower is 
something entirely different than to a Third World country. It is therefore important for 
each state in the global system to decide what its concept of security is and take the 
appropriate steps to ensure its security priorities are met. Japan, the United States, and a 
reunified China and Taiwan would most likely have some shared security concerns, while 
at the same time each would possess its own individual concerns that it may consider 
central. The points where theses concerns diverge or converge can be the basis for 
conflict or cooperation. The way these perceived conflicts of security concerns are 
handled will depend on the desired outcome.   
The responses by states to threats have implications for foreign policy. There are 
several approaches that states can take when dealing with international security issues. 
Two common responses are to either balance against the threat or to bandwagon with the 
aggressor in order to enjoy the spoils of aggression.179  The following section will discuss 
Japan’s potential response to the reunification of China and Taiwan in terms of balancing, 
bandwagoning, and deterrence.  
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B. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MECHANISMS 
1. Balancing 
Kenneth Waltz makes several assumptions in describing balance of power theory. 
The first assumption is that the state is a unitary actor which seeks at a minimum its own 
survival and at the most seeks world domination.180 When states believe they are 
threatened by a stronger power or perceive a power to be emerging, they will band 
together in order to maintain the status quo.181 States use internal and external efforts to 
maintain their standing in the international order.182 States do not necessarily always 
balance for the same reasons. In certain instances strong states may ally with other strong 
states when the collective perception is that a weaker state may pose a threat in a specific 
area.183 This describes the U.S.-Japan security alliance today.  
Article Nine of the constitution that was imposed on Japan following its defeat in 
WWII stipulated that Japan would forever renounce war as a right of the nation and that 
they would not maintain a standing military.184 Thus, the Japanese were not able to 
provide for their own defense. The United States and Japan signed the first of two 
security treaties in 1951. The treaty allowed the United States to keep troops and 
equipment on Japanese sovereign territory.185 According to the Japanese interpretation of 
Article Nine, they would not be able to come to the aid of the Americans should the U.S. 
forces find themselves under attack. The Yoshida Doctrine focused all of Japan’s efforts 
on economic recovery while leaving the defense of the country to the United States.186 
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The National Security Strategy of the United States lays out what, according to 
the current administration, is important to the U.S. national interest. The latest version 
makes reference to supporting existing democracies and fostering a global environment 
which is conducive to the formation of new democratic regimes.187 There has been a long 
standing belief that democracies do not go to war with each other. The treaty also 
recognizes that with the world becoming ever smaller due to globalization, what used to 
be a problem in Asia for example would only affect Asia, but now it has a global impact.  
While it is true that with the end of the Cold War the United States lost its major 
military competitor in Asia as well as the rest of the world, there are still other reasons 
that make the U.S.-Japan Security alliance of vital importance to the United States. The 
U.S.-Japan Security Alliance remains essential to the peace and stability of Asia.188 Due 
to the overlapping national interests of Japan and the United States, it makes this 
partnership a natural fit. Thanks to Japan providing bases for U.S. forces in the region, 
the United States is able to shape the security environment of the region. This is central to 
ensuring the national security strategy is carried out. Without the continuation of the 
alliance, the United States would lose its forward basing option for the most formidable 
forward presence operations in history. 
When it was first devised, the security alliance between Japan and the United 
States was one link in the deterrent chain against the ever expanding communist sphere of 
influence.189 With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, the alliance 
continues to be important to both countries. While the PRC remains insistent that the 
expansion of its economic and military capacity is intended for peaceful purposes, the 
rise of China is seen by some in both the United States and Japan to be the first step in its 
attempt to regain its former position as a top player on the world stage.190 Japan and the 
United States are currently balancing against potential regional instability with their 
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continued alliance. One manifestation of this continued alliance is Theater Missile 
Defense (TMD). China has been a staunch opponent of Japan importing the TMD 
technology to the island. China believes it would increase the U.S. and Japan’s collective 
potential for containing China.191 
U.S. Forces in Northeast Asia are only based in Japan and South Korea. The 
forces in South Korea are historically not deployable although they have been used in 
recent years to augment the troops in Iraq. They are stationed there as a deterrent against 
the renewed aggression of the North Koreans. The forces in Japan however, are not only 
deployable but are some of the most robust U.S. forces based anywhere in the world, 
including the continental United States. The Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marines all 
have substantial troops and equipment forward deployed to the Japanese area of 
operations. Again this serves as a deterrent against aggression towards Japan, but more 
importantly theses forces ensure the continued security of Asia.192 Without Japan, the 
next closest forces available would be in Diego Garcia, which is much farther to the east 
and cannot handle the magnitude of forces stationed in Japan.     
2. Bandwagoning 
The concept of bandwagoning is often described as the opposite of balancing.193  
In this instance a state will ally itself with the stronger state. This can occur for several 
reasons. For centuries it has been the belief of would-be conquerors that nothing begets 
success like success. The weaker states involved in a conflict, or potential conflict, will 
look to the stronger state and make the decision that it is more beneficial to be have the 
stronger power as an ally rather than an adversary. This theory is more controversial than 
balancing because the states joining the stronger side do not necessarily bring as much to 
the relationship and therefore are automatically the lesser partner in the alliance.  
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Randall Schweller puts forth the proposition that bandwagoning is not necessarily 
always entered into in order to achieve security.194 A strategy of bandwagoning can be 
undertaken in order to reap the rewards of being on the side of the stronger power. 
Schweller goes on to say that more security-minded states tend to balance whereas more 
greedy states tend to bandwagon. “Jackal bandwagoning” is where a state joins a 
coalition merely for the profit.195 The perfect example of this is Mussolini’s partnership 
with the Third Reich. “Piling-on bandwagoning” would be used to describe a state 
joining the winning side after the outcome of the war had already been decided.196 
The most useful description of bandwagoning provided by Schweller for this 
discussion is the “wave of the future bandwagoning.”197 In this scenario the lesser 
powers see what they believe to be the rise of one power and the decline of another and 
decide to join the up and coming power in hopes of increased security and wealth. While 
the United States and Japan have balanced against the other powers of Asia for the past 
several decades, the fundamental relationship of these two would likely change with the 
unification of China and Taiwan. Given this, the United States would no longer need to 
be as militarily engaged in Asia. Japan would need to decide a course of action to deal 
with China. 
Historically Japan has acted pragmatically when it comes to its relationship with 
China.198 Japan would be looking for a relationship to replace the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance in the wake of lessened U.S. engagement in Asia. While Japan would not 
necessarily be forced to bandwagon with a rising China, an option it would consider 
would be something close to the classical interpretation of bandwagoning. With their 
history of conflict, it would be difficult for China and Japan to reach such an agreement, 
but such a compromise would be mutually beneficial to both parties.  
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3. Deterrence 
According to one prominent author, Lawrence Freedman, deterrence is a strategy 
of coercion.199 There are many facets to the strategy of deterrence. It can be strategic or 
internalized. With strategic deterrence, the concept is employed as a conscious decision. 
One state, or group of states, believes that another state or group of states intends to do 
them harm in some way. The first group then does its best to convince the second group 
that if it attempts to do so, there will be repercussions that will prove to be less than 
acceptable to the second group.200 This was the Cold War thinking of the United States 
and its allies with regards to the Soviet Union.201 Deterrence can also be unconscious, in 
which case it is internalized deterrence. In this situation, the aggressor concludes, often 
without the knowledge of the other party, that the cost incurred from whatever action 
they may have been planning is not worth the reward.202 It is also possible for both 
dynamics to be present in the same situation. It would seem that both strategic and 
internalized deterrence have been part of the strategy employed by the United States and 
Japan vis-à-vis China. The U.S.-Japan security alliance has acted as a deterrent against 
aggression by China both towards Taiwan and Asia as a whole. There has been a 
conscious effort by the United States and Japan, while China has internally weighed the 
costs and benefits of aggression. 
Deterrence will fail, according to Robert Jervis, if the aggressor believes that the 
more powerful nations are weak in capacity or determination to check the actions of the 
aggressor.203 Should the status quo power back down the challenger will be encouraged 
in further aggression. This attitude will change when the aggressor believes it will not be 
able to bully the status quo power into succumbing to its will.204 Again, The U.S.-Japan 
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alliance serves to further this purpose. Would be challengers to the status quo see the 
resolve of the two powers in Asia, Japan and the United States, and do not want to risk 
losing the benefits of appositive relationship with these two countries or their allies. 
Japan and the United States are the number one and two economies in the world.205  
China relies on these two countries for foreign investment, export and import markets.206 
With the current regime of the in Beijing being pragmatic, it has made the calculation that 
upsetting the status quo would not be beneficial. 
Were China and Taiwan to reunify peacefully, the dynamics of the situation with 
regard to relations between Japan, China and the United States would change. The largest 
impediment to the U.S.-China relationship would be removed from the equation. Since 
one interaction influences the outcomes of other situations, Japan would likely reevaluate 
its own relationship with the United States.207 The major reason for continued U.S. troop 
presence in Asia would be removed.208 Japan would, in the case of diminished U.S. 
engagement in Asia, need to reexamine its current stance on Article Nine of its 
constitution.209 Japan currently has a quite robust military, but is only allowed to use it in 
a self defense role based on its constitution. As discussed above this has allowed it to 
become the economic power it is today. Without the guarantee of U.S. assistance and 
protection in the event of aggression Japan would be forced to provide for its own 
security. It would not take much for the Japanese to turn their SDF into an actual military. 
With the U.S. technology they have benefited from the last several decades; it would be a 
formidable opponent for any state.210 
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The alliance provides a nuclear umbrella for Japan, which in turn provides a 
powerful deterrent to any nation that would consider the use of nuclear weapons against 
the island nation. This agreement helps ensure Japan does not become a nuclear power. 
211 Should Japan become a nuclear power, an arms race could conceivably break out in 
Asia. South Korea would not be keen to have a nuclear Japan in its backyard. The South 
Koreans would in this case most likely attempt to obtain their own nuclear capability. 
This would throw off the strategic balance of the entire world. Some have argued that a 
domino effect could take place, whereby other currently non-nuclear nations would feel 
compelled to become so in order to ensure their own security, leading to a less stable 
global security environment. The presence of U.S. troops on Japanese soil provides for 
continued security and deters against such a contingency.  
However, as some have suggested, nuclear weapons by themselves do not 
necessarily deter.212 The other side has to believe one is willing to use them in order for 
the deterrent effect to work. As the only nation ever to experience the horrific effects of 
atomic destruction, it is difficult to say whether or not Japan would consider approving 
legislation to change its constitution and bring such a weapon to bear on an adversary. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the current situation, the changes brought about by the reunification 
of China and Taiwan would be felt in Washington and Tokyo. The greatest impediment 
to the U.S.-China relationship would be removed. The need for the United States to 
remain an active military participant in Asian affairs would no longer exist. 
Economically, the United States will continue to increase its footprint in Asia for the 
foreseeable future. As China rises, the opportunities for cooperation in responsible energy 
consumption and discovery will become greater. Should the reunification of China and 
Taiwan be accomplished in a peaceful manner, the strong economic ties that currently 
exist between China and the United States will continue and most likely improve. 
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Continued diplomatic inroads between the two countries would also likely continue.213 
The best options for the United States would be positive incentives towards the China in 
this scenario. 
The relationship with Japan and China is centuries old and exceedingly complex. 
Japan has many options when dealing with a reunified China and Taiwan. Given their 
shared history, some outcomes are more likely than others. The current regimes of both 
countries have proven themselves to be pragmatic when dealing with international 
relations. China is wary of the militarization of Japan and visa versa. This would likely 
only intensify in the wake of lowered U.S. commitments to the security of Japan. The 
Japanese would look to increase their military capabilities while at the same time 
continuing to remain economically strong in the region. Balancing would be a better 
option for the Japanese than bandwagoning with regards to China. Through the 
deterrence provided by an improved military capability, the Japanese would be in a better 
position to balance against a unified China and Taiwan and help safeguard continued 
stability in the region.  
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